

<p>DISTRICT COURT, DENVER COUNTY, COLORADO Court Address: 1437 Bannock Street Denver, CO 80202</p> <hr/> <p>Plaintiffs: FRIENDS OF DENVER PARKS, INC., a Colorado non-profit corporation; and STEVE WALDSTEIN, an individual; ZELDA HAWKINS, an individual; MEMBERS OF THE PETITIONERS COMMITTEE TO REPEAL DENVER ORDINANCE 170, consisting of JOHN CASE, JUDITH M. CASE, RENEE LEWIS, DAVID HILL, AND SHAWN SMITH.</p> <p>Defendant: DEBRA JOHNSON, in her capacity as clerk and recorder of the City and County of Denver.</p> <hr/> <p>Plaintiff's Attorneys: John Case, Esq. Atty reg. # 2431 Benson & Case, LLP 1660 So. Albion Street, Suite 1100 Denver, Colorado 80222 Phone Number: (303) 757-8300 FAX Number: (303) 753-0444 E-mail: case@bensoncase.com</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">▲ COURT USE ONLY▲</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">Case No.: 2013CV032444</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Courtroom 376</p>
<p>THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND AGAINST DEBRA JOHNSON IN HER CAPACITY AS CLERK AND RECORDER</p>	

Plaintiffs, through counsel BENSON & CASE, LLP, submit this 3rd Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive relief, and for judicial review of the acts of Defendant Debra Johnson (“Johnson”) pursuant to CRCP 106(a)(4).

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

Pursuant to CRCP 106(4)(a) seek judicial review of the clerk and recorder’s rejection of the Petitioners Committee referendum petition.

On July 1, 2013 Plaintiffs submitted to Johnson a signed referendum petition to repeal Denver Ordinance No. 170 (“the referendum petition”). The referendum petition was signed by 6,664 registered voters in the city and county of Denver. 6,129 signatures are required to place the issue on the ballot. The referendum petition included more than enough signatures to place the issue on the ballot.

On July 3, 2013 Johnson rejected the referendum petition. Johnson refuses to place the referendum issue on the ballot as required by the city Charter.

Johnson relies upon section 8.3.2 (C) of the city Charter, which states in pertinent part:

No petition shall be circulated nor shall any signatures be procured until such affidavit, petition sample, and ballot title are approved by the Clerk and Recorder.

Johnson claims that since she never approved the referendum petition, Plaintiffs had no right to circulate it.

Plaintiffs claim that section 8.3.2 on its face and as applied violates plaintiffs' fundamental rights to petition their government pursuant to the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, COLO. CONST. Art. 5, § 1, and city Charter section 8.3.1.

Determination of the issues herein necessarily requires a judicial determination of whether the city acted in a legislative capacity when it subdivided Hampden Heights North Park ("HHNP") into two separate parcels with two different land uses on April 1, 2013. Since 1967, the 26 acre parcel known as HHNP had been zoned as "Public – Open Space – Park." At public expense, the Denver Department of Parks and Recreation owned, managed, and constructed improvements including bridges and public trails through HHNP. On April 1, 2013 the city reversed its previous 45 years of land use policy as to HHNP. Ordinance No. 168, based on a new survey that subdivided the 26 acres into a north parcel and a south parcel, designated the north 16 acre parcel as part of Paul A. Hentzell Park. Ordinance No. 170 approved trade of the south 10.7 acre parcel to Denver Public School District No. 1 ("DPS") for construction of a new elementary school. Plaintiffs assert that the subdivision of HHNP into two parcels, one of which will be used for construction of a school in land previously designated as open space park land, constitutes legislative action and de-facto zoning that is subject to repeal by the people. Plaintiffs further assert that HHNP is city park land pursuant to Charter section 2.4.5 and Municipal Code, Sec. 39-191 (2), which may not be sold by city officials without a vote of the people.

STANDING OF PLAINTIFFS

1. Plaintiff Friends of Denver Parks, Inc. ("Friends") is a private, non-profit corporation organized and existing under the laws of Colorado with its office located at 10081 E. Cornell Ave. Denver CO 80231. The corporate office is located on real property directly adjacent to Paul A. Hentzell Park and Natural Area.
2. The Members of Friends are Judith M. Case, 10081 E. Cornell Ave. Denver CO 80231; Renee Lewis, 2770 S. Elmira St. Unit 38, Denver CO 80231; David Hill, 2770 S. Elmira St. Unit 38, Denver CO 80231; and Shawn Smith, 3905 S. Monaco Parkway Denver CO 80237.

3. All Members of Friends are also members of the Petitioners Committee of the Referendum Petition to Repeal Denver Municipal Ordinance 170, series 2013.
4. The Members of Friends live in close proximity to HHNP.
5. All of Friends' Members are adult voting residents of the City and County of Denver who use and value the Property for its aesthetic beauty and natural state.
6. Plaintiff Steve Waldstein ("Waldstein") is an individual who owns the real property and resides at 3326 S Geneva Street Denver, CO 80231 in the Hampden Heights neighborhood.
7. Waldstein's residence is directly adjacent to the Property.
8. Waldstein purchased his residence in the Hampden Heights neighborhood in 1999 because of its proximity to the beauty and aesthetic value of the Property.
9. When purchasing his residence adjacent to the Property, Waldstein relied to his detriment on City representations that Hampden Heights North Park was park land and open space, and that the Property would remain park land and open space.
10. Plaintiff Zelda Hawkins ("Hawkins") is an individual who owns real property and resides at 3319 S. Galena Street Denver, CO 80231 in the Hampden Heights neighborhood.
11. Hawkins residence is near the Property.
12. Hawkins purchased her residence in the Hampden Heights neighborhood in the year 1996 because of its proximity to the beauty and aesthetic value of the Property.
13. When purchasing her residence near the Property, Hawkins relied to her detriment on City representations that Hampden Heights North Park was park land and open space, and that the Property would remain park land and open space.
14. The members of the Petitioners Committee are: John Case, 10081 E. Cornell Ave. Denver Colorado, 80231; Judith M. Case, 10081 E. Cornell Ave. Denver Colorado, 80231; Renee Lewis, 2770 S. Elmira St. Unit 38, Denver CO 80231; David Hill, 2770 S. Elmira St. Unit 38, Denver CO 80231; and Shawn Smith, 3905 S. Monaco Parkway Denver CO 80237 (hereafter referred to collectively as "Petitioners Committee").

15. All individual plaintiffs circulated a referendum petition to repeal Denver Ordinance No. 170, Series of 2013.
16. Unless the Court grants injunctive relief, all Plaintiffs, as well as the citizens of Denver, will suffer imminent injury in fact to a legally protected interest fairly traceable to the Defendant's conduct. *Friends of Black Forest v. County Commissioners of El Paso County* 80 P.3d 871 (Colo. App. 2003).

FACTS

17. Plaintiffs incorporate all other allegations of this Complaint as if fully re-written.
18. This action concerns 26 acres of park land referred to on Denver city maps as "Hampden Heights North Park" ("HHNP").
19. HHNP is a triangular shaped parcel located immediately west of South Havana St. and immediately north of E. Girard Ave. in the city and county of Denver.
20. The City acquired title to HHNP on or about October 9, 1936 by deed recorded at Book 379, Page 65, in the records of Arapahoe County ("the 1936 Deed").
21. At all times relevant since 1967 the City zoned HHNP as "Public - Open Space – Park Land"
22. At all times relevant since 1967 the City identified HHNP as "Public - Open Space – Park Land" on its official zoning and planning maps that the city published and distributed to Denver citizens.
23. At all times relevant from 1967 until 2012, city officials represented to the plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest that HHNP was park land and would remain a park in perpetuity.
24. At all times relevant from October 1936 until present, the citizens of Denver, including the Plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest, used HHNP for recreation and park purposes, including but not limited to horseback riding, bicycling, walking, bird watching, observing native prairie grasses and fauna, wildlife watching, playing, wading and exploring in Cherry Creek, and finding arrowheads and animal bones hunted by earlier civilizations.
25. At all times relevant since 1936 HHNP has been owned and managed by the Denver Department of Parks and Recreation and its predecessor departments.
26. At all times relevant since 1967 the city expended public funds to maintain HHNP, mow the grasses, control weeds, and control prairie dogs. The city expended public funds to construct physical improvements for the benefit of Denver citizens including but not limited to (1) asphalt bicycle trails, (2)

concrete bicycle trails, (3) bridges over Cherry Creek and its tributaries for bicyclists and pedestrians, (4) a split rail fence to demarcate the west boundary of HHNP at the junction with the greenbelt trail to Hampden Heights Park; and (5) signs to post park rules for HHNP, signs prohibiting motor vehicles in HHNP, and signs providing directions to bicyclists and pedestrians.

27. HHNP and Paul A. Hentzell Park form a continuous, open park and Natural Area within Denver. The Natural Area borders the banks of Cherry Creek. It includes a Historic Trail over which pioneers and gold prospectors traveled along Cherry Creek to Denver. It was formerly used as a Native American hunting ground for bison and deer. Motor vehicles are not allowed. The natural area is home to numerous and fascinating indigenous species of plant and animal life, including deer, fox, coyote, skunk, raccoon, muskrat, prairie dogs, rabbits, beaver, hummingbirds, chickadees, robins, sparrows, magpies, crows, woodpeckers, flickers, finches, doves, blackbirds, other small birds, butterflies, caterpillars, ant colonies, roly poly bugs, insects, crawdads, minnows, bull snakes, garter snakes, ducks, geese, heron, owls, and hawks, all of which are seen, heard and enjoyed on a regular basis by citizens of Denver and their children who walk and play and bicycle in the natural area.

28. Section 2.4.5 of the Denver City Charter states:

Charter § 2.4.5 - Sale and leasing of parks.

Without the approval of a majority of those registered electors voting in an election held by the City and County of Denver, no park or portion of any park belonging to the City as of December 31, 1955, shall be sold or leased at any time, and no land acquired by the City after December 31, 1955, that is designated a park by ordinance shall be sold or leased at any time, provided, however, that property in parks may be leased for park purposes to concessionaires, to charitable or nonprofit organizations, or to governmental jurisdictions. All such leases shall require the approval of Council as provided for in Article III of this Charter. No land acquired by the City after December 31, 1955, shall be deemed a park unless specifically designated a park by ordinance.

(Charter 1960, A4.5; amended May 17, 1955; amended May 17, 1983; amended August 19, 1996)

29. The City Municipal Code, Sec. 39-191 (2) defines *City park land* as follows:

City park land. Any parks, parkways, mountain parks and other recreational facilities, as well as other land, waterways and water

bodies, owned, operated or controlled by the department of parks and recreation.

30. The City Municipal Code 39-191 (1) defines *Natural Area* as follows:

Natural area. A geographical area of land of either geologic or biologic significance which retains, has had reestablished, or has the potential to reestablish many aspects of its natural character. Such an area could now or in the future support native vegetation, associated biological and geological features, or provide habitat for indigenous wildlife or plant species. Such an area could host geological, scenic, or other natural features of scientific, aesthetic, or educational value.

31. At all times since 1936 HHNP is and was a park.

32. At all times relevant, HHNP met the above definition of “*City park land.*”

33. At all times relevant, HHNP met the above definition of “*Natural Area.*”

34. HHNP has remained in its natural state and has been open to the use and enjoyment of the public since the City acquired the Property in 1936.

35. At all times relevant the City allowed the Plaintiffs and all citizens of Denver, and members of the public at large, to use HHNP and Paul A. Hentzell Park as a single, continuous, open, Park and Natural Area.

36. HHNP has been designated by common law use as park land. *McIntyre v. Board of Commissioners of El Paso County*, 61 P. 237 (Colo. App. 1900)

37. HHNP is a park that belonged to the city as of December 31, 1955, and is protected under Charter section 2.4.5.

38. The City owns HHNP in trust as trustee for the citizens of Denver. *Id.*

39. In approximately 2011, agents of the City and DPS entered into a secret oral agreement to trade part of HHNP for an office building at 1330 Fox St., Denver CO.

40. The City and DPS entered into the secret oral agreement without notice to the public or other interested parties, including but not limited to the plaintiffs, Denver Parks and Recreation Advisory Board, Inter-Neighborhood Cooperation, and members of the Denver City Council.

41. On April 1, 2013 the Denver City Council conducted a meeting at which it

adopted two ordinances, numbered 168 and 170, that subdivided HHNP into two separate parcels.

42. The subdivision of HHNP into two parcels on April 1, 2013 constituted legislative action in that it reversed the City's land use policy in effect for 45 years, and effectively re-zoned 10.7 acres from "Public – Open Space – Park Land" to a commercial building site for a school or other commercial development.
43. Ordinance No. 168 designated the north 16 acres of HHNP as part of Paul A. Hentzell Park. The City mayor and Defendant Johnson signed Ordinance 168 on April 2, 2013. Notice of Ordinance 168 was published in the Daily Journal March 29 and April 5, 2013.
44. Ordinance No. 170 approved transfer of the southern 10.771 acres HHNP to DPS pursuant to a written contract ("the Contract"). The City mayor and Defendant Johnson signed Ordinance 170 on April 2, 2013. Notice of Ordinance 170 was published in the Daily Journal March 29 and April 5, 2013.
45. The Contract trades 10.771 acres of HHNP for an office building at 1330 Fox St.
46. On information and belief, the Contract is scheduled to close on or about July 10, 2013.
47. The right of Denver citizens to vote is a fundamental right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution of Colorado.
48. The right of Denver citizens to vote prior to the sale of any city park land is a fundamental right guaranteed by Charter section 2.4.5.
49. Transfer of HHNP without a vote of the people violates Charter section 2.4.5.
50. The City acted *ultra vires*, in excess of its lawful authority, by entering into a contract to sell park land without a vote of the people.
51. The Contract benefits the mayor and city officials, who avoid the obligation to pay full cash value for an office building at 1330 Fox St., by trading away park land that belongs to the people and cannot be replaced.
52. The Contract benefits DPS by providing DPS with open space park land that has commercial value and development potential, in exchange for property at 1330 Fox St. that DPS bondholders must value at more than \$7 Million, but which has actual market value of less than \$4 Million.
53. The Contract also benefits DPS by requiring the City to pay \$705,000 cash.

54. On July 1, 2013 Petitioners Committee delivered to Defendant Johnson the signed referendum petition with 6,664 valid signatures of registered Denver voters (“the referendum petition”).
55. 6,664 valid signatures of registered Denver voters is a sufficient number to place the referendum issue on the ballot at the next election.
56. On July 3, 2013 Johnson delivered a letter to Petitioners Committee that rejected the referendum petition.
57. Johnson refuses to place the referendum issue on the ballot.
58. Johnson refuses to let the citizens of Denver exercise their fundamental right to vote on the sale of park land pursuant to Charter section 2.4.5.
59. Johnson refuses to let the citizens of Denver exercise their fundamental right to vote on the repeal of ordinance 170.
60. Plaintiffs have a reasonable probability of success on the merits.
61. The danger of real, immediate, and irreparable injury will be prevented by injunctive relief.
62. Plaintiffs and the citizens of Denver have no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.
63. A preliminary injunction will not disserve any public interest since Plaintiffs are protecting and preserving the public’s interest in dedicated and designated City park land, Natural Area, and open space, and protecting the fundamental right of the people of Denver to vote before park land is sold.
64. A balance of the equities favors granting preliminary and permanent injunctive relief.
65. Entry of a preliminary injunction and or/injunction pending appeal will preserve the status quo pending a trial on the merits of the Complaint.

I. FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST DEFENDANT JOHNSON

For Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

66. Plaintiffs incorporate all other allegations of this Complaint as if fully re-written.
67. Defendant Debra Johnson (“Johnson”) holds the Office of Clerk and Recorder of the City and County of Denver, to which she was elected by vote of the people of Denver.

68. The clerk and recorder is not required to have legal training and does not perform judicial functions.
69. In ruling upon plaintiffs' referendum petition, Johnson did not exercise independent legal judgment, but instead, relied upon the Denver City Attorney, who wrote the rulings for her.
70. The City Attorney is appointed by, and serves at the pleasure of, the mayor. The City Attorney is the agent of the mayor.
71. In rejecting plaintiffs referendum petition, Johnson cited section 8.3.2 (C) of the city Charter, which states in pertinent part:

No petition shall be circulated nor shall any signatures be procured until such affidavit, petition sample, and ballot title are approved by the Clerk and Recorder.
72. Section 8.3.2 of the Charter on its face and as applied allows the clerk and recorder and City Attorney absolute discretion to make judicial determinations as to the legal sufficiency of voter initiated petitions, thereby usurping the power that belongs to the judicial branch of government.
73. Section 8.3.2 of the Charter on its face and as applied allows the clerk and recorder and City Attorney to interfere with and thwart voter petition initiatives, for the improper purpose of accomplishing political objectives of the mayor and the clerk and recorder that are in opposition to the will of the people.
74. Section 8.3.2 of the Charter on its face and as applied violates the plaintiffs' fundamental right to petition their government, and the fundamental right of the people to govern themselves by referendum, which rights are guaranteed by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, Art. V, Section 1 of the Constitution of Colorado, and Section 8.3.1 of the Denver City Charter.
75. Section 8.3.2 of the Charter on its face and as applied violates plaintiffs' fundamental right to due process of law, which right is guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article II, Section 25 of the Constitution of Colorado.
76. Section 8.3.2 of the Charter on its face and as applied violates plaintiffs' fundamental right to equal protection of the law and equality of justice, which rights are guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article II, Section 6 of the Constitution of Colorado.

WHEREFORE, on their First Claim for Relief against Defendant Johnson, Plaintiffs pray that this Honorable Court enter Declaratory Judgment that Charter section 8.3.2 on its face and as applied violates fundamental rights of the plaintiffs and

the people of Denver guaranteed by the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, Article II Sections 10 and 25, and Article V § 1 of the Constitution of Colorado, and section 8.3.1 of the Charter of the City and County of Denver. Plaintiffs pray further that the Court enjoin the clerk and recorder from denying the plaintiffs their fundamental right to circulate and obtain signatures on the referendum petition. Plaintiffs pray that the Court determine that the applicable 90 day period for plaintiffs to obtain signatures on the referendum petition began on May 20, 2013 and will end on August 19, 2013. Plaintiffs pray further that the court order the clerk and recorder to place the referendum ballot issue on the ballot at the next general election. Plaintiffs pray further for costs including expert witness fees, for reasonable attorney fees, and for all other appropriate relief

II. SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST DEFENDANT JOHNSON

For Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

77. Plaintiffs incorporate all other allegations of this Complaint as if fully re-written.
78. The City Attorney is appointed by, and serves at the pleasure of, the mayor.
79. At all times relevant since April 1, 2013, assistant city attorney David Broadwell acted as counsel for Johnson and the mayor, and acted as defendants' agent in communicating with the Petitioners Committee concerning the ballot issue.
80. At a public meeting on April 10, 2013 Mr. Broadwell advised the Petitioners Committee that Ordinance 170 was an administrative action that could not be repealed by voter referendum.
81. Defendant Johnson and the mayor intended that Petitioners Committee would rely upon the advice of Mr. Broadwell and give up their rights to file a referendum petition.
82. Petitioners Committee did in fact rely on Mr. Broadwell's advice to the extent that Petitioners Committee delayed filing a referendum petition until its counsel could determine, by independent legal research, whether the action of city council in subdividing HHNP on April 1, 2013 constituted legislative action subject to repeal by referendum, or whether the subdivision of HHNP was administrative action not subject to repeal by referendum, as the city defendants were claiming.
83. On May 20, 2013 counsel for Petitioners Committee determined that the subdivision of HHNP by city council in ordinances 168 and 170 on April 1, 2013 constituted de-facto re-zoning of HHNP and was legislative action subject to repeal by referendum. Counsel so advised Johnson by letter dated May 20, 2013 (Exhibit 6).

84. The intentional acts of defendants and their agent interfered with Plaintiffs' fundamental rights to petition their government.
85. Charter sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.4 require citizens to submit a referendum petition within 90 days after final passage and publication of an ordinance.
86. The intentional acts of defendants and their agent caused the plaintiffs to delay 50 days before beginning to circulate their referendum petition.
87. The intentional acts of defendants and their agent caused the Petitioners Committee to lose 50 days of the 90 days allowed by Charter sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.4 to submit a referendum petition.
88. Plaintiffs ask the Court exercise its equitable power to allow the Petitioners Committee 90 days from May 20, 2013 in which to circulate and obtain signatures on the referendum petition, and to include all signatures on the 120 petition sections filed with the clerk and recorder on July 1, 2013.

WHEREFORE, on their Second Claim for Relief against Defendant Johnson, Plaintiffs pray that this Honorable Court enter Declaratory Judgment that the Defendant Johnson both individually and through her agents interfered with Plaintiffs' fundamental rights to petition their government. Plaintiffs pray that the Court determine that the intentional acts of defendants and their agents caused the plaintiffs to delay 50 days before beginning to circulate their referendum petition, and to lose 50 days of the 90 days allowed by Charter sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.4 to submit a referendum petition. Plaintiffs pray that the Court determine that the applicable 90 day period for plaintiffs to obtain signatures on the referendum petition began on May 20, 2013 and will end on August 19, 2013. Plaintiffs invoke the equitable power of the court to allow them 90 days from May 20, 2013 in which to circulate and obtain signatures on the referendum petition, and to include all signatures on the 120 petition sections filed with the clerk and recorder on July 1, 2013. Plaintiffs pray further for costs including expert witness fees, for reasonable attorney fees, and for all other appropriate relief

III. THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST DEFENDANT JOHNSON

For Declaratory and Injunctive Relief to allow Plaintiffs 90 days to cure any insufficiencies in the number of signatures

89. Plaintiffs incorporate all other allegations of this Complaint as if fully re-written.
90. In order to place the referendum issue on the ballot, Plaintiffs are required to collect valid signatures from registered Denver voters equaling five percent of the total votes cast in the previous mayoral election. Currently this equals 6,129 valid signatures.

91. Between May 20, 2013 and June 30, 2013 Plaintiffs were able to collect 6,664 valid signatures from registered Denver voters, which equals more than the required five percent of the total votes cast in the previous mayoral election.
92. On July 1, 2013 Petitioners Committee delivered to Defendant Johnson the signed referendum petition with 6,664 valid signatures of registered Denver voters (“the referendum petition”).
93. The referendum petition complied in all respects with the form required by Charter section 8.3.2.
94. On information and belief, Johnson will use her power as clerk and recorder to invalidate as many signatures as possible.
95. Section 8.3.2 (H) of the Charter states in pertinent part:

Filing of petitions; determination of sufficiency; protest and hearings. After signatures have been obtained, the petitioners' committee shall file the completed petition with the Clerk and Recorder no later than close of business on a normal business day. All related petition sections shall be filed at the same time. The Clerk and Recorder shall record the same and shall hold the petition for a period of twenty-five days, during which time the Clerk and Recorder shall determine whether the petition is signed by the requisite number of registered electors. In the event the Clerk and Recorder determines that the petition contains an insufficient number of signatures, the Clerk and Recorder shall notify the petitioners' committee of the insufficiency, and the petitioners' committee may cure the insufficiency by filing an addendum to the original petition for the purpose of offering such number of additional signatures as will cure the insufficiency. *Any addendum shall be filed within the time period allowed for the original petition as provided in this Charter.* (italics added)

96. Read in context, the italicized sentence allows plaintiffs an additional 90 days from the date of notice of insufficiency to cure the insufficiency by gathering additional signatures.
97. On information and belief, Johnson intends to rule that the above italicized sentence requires the plaintiffs to submit any addendum petition sections no later than July 5, 2013.
98. Such an interpretation by the clerk and recorder will make it impossible for the plaintiffs to cure any insufficiencies in the number of signatures.

99. Such an interpretation by the clerk and recorder will not be the independent legal judgment of the clerk and recorder, but will be in fact the opinion of the City Attorney, who will draft the expected ruling for the clerk and recorder for the improper purpose of preventing the citizens of Denver from voting on the valid referendum petition.

100. The acts and threatened acts of the clerk and recorder actually interfere with and actually will abridge the fundamental rights of plaintiffs and the citizens of Denver to govern themselves and vote to repeal legislation by referendum.

WHEREFORE, on their Third Claim for Relief against Defendant Johnson, Plaintiffs pray that this Honorable Court enter Declaratory Judgment that the Petitioners Committee shall be allowed 90 days from the date of notice of insufficiencies to cure any insufficiencies in the number of signatures. Plaintiffs pray further for costs including expert witness fees, for reasonable attorney fees, and for all other appropriate relief.

IV. FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST DEFENDANT JOHNSON

For review of the acts of the clerk and recorder pursuant to CRCP 106(a)(4)

101. Plaintiffs incorporate all other allegations of this Complaint as if fully re-written.

102. At 2:58 p.m. on May 13, 2013 Petitioners Committee submitted a proposed form of affidavit, referendum petition sample, and ballot title to Defendant Johnson.

103. On May 17, 2013 Johnson sent to Petitioners Committee a letter rejecting the proposed form of referendum petition.

104. Denver Charter section 8.3.2 (C) states in pertinent part:

The Clerk and Recorder shall have three (3) full working days from the time of the filing of the affidavit to review the affidavit, petition sample, and ballot title. At the end of the three (3) working days, the Clerk and Recorder must either accept or reject the affidavit, petition sample, or ballot title. (Emphasis added)

105. On May 17, 2013 at 9:01 a.m. Johnson issued a letter which purported to reject the affidavit, petition sample, and ballot title.

106. The duration of time from 2:58 p.m. on May 13, 2013 until 9:01 a.m. on May 17, 2013 is more than three full working days.

107. Johnson failed to accept or reject the affidavit, petition sample, and ballot title within three full working days from the time of filing.
108. By failing to comply with the Charter, the clerk and recorder lost jurisdiction to make any further rulings upon the referendum petition.
109. Johnson exceeded her jurisdiction because she failed to act within three full working days of the time the original affidavit, petition sample, and ballot title were submitted.
110. On July 1, 2013 Petitioners Committee delivered to Defendant Johnson the signed referendum petition with 6,664 valid signatures of registered Denver voters (“the referendum petition”).
111. The referendum petition complied in all respects with the form required by Charter section 8.3.2.
112. On July 3, 2013 Johnson rejected the referendum petition.
113. In rejecting the referendum petition filed by the Petitioners Committee July 1, 2013, Johnson exceeded her jurisdiction and abused her discretion.
114. In accordance with CRCP 106(a)(4)(III), this complaint is accompanied by a motion and proposed order requiring Defendant Johnson to certify the record.

WHEREFORE, on their Fourth Claim for Relief against Defendant Johnson, Plaintiffs pray that this Honorable Court enter Declaratory Judgment that the clerk and recorder exceeded her jurisdiction and abused her discretion by rejecting the referendum petition on July 3, 2013. Plaintiffs pray further that the court order the clerk and recorder to place the referendum issue on the ballot at the next election. Plaintiffs pray further for costs including expert witness fees, for reasonable attorney fees, and for all other appropriate relief

Respectfully submitted July 5, 2013.

BENSON & CASE, LLP

s/John Case

John Case #2431

